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Is There a Case for Mandating Directly Elected ‘Semi-Executive’ Mayors 
in Australian Local Government? Lessons from the 2012 Queensland Local 
Government Elections 
 
Abstract: A ‘semi-executive’ model for Australian mayors, inclusive of direct election, 
is presently being promoted by some elements in the Australian local sector (see, in 
particular, Sansom, 2012). This paper takes advantage of the differences across 
Australia’s federation to examine the reality of directly elected mayors in Queensland, 
especially the results of local government elections held in 2012. It is argued that 
several factors contributed to the high turnover rates of both mayors and councillors, 
including the 2012 Queensland state election and the 2008 amalgamation process. 
However, the requirement for directly elected mayors was an important factor 
contributing to what the Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ, 2012, 
12) described as a ‘significantly high’ proportion of ‘corporate knowledge’ being lost. 
Moreover, the direct election of mayors, in particular those charged with ‘semi-
executive’ authority, is fraught with problems and thus should not to be implemented in 
all Australian local government systems. 
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In common with other countries (see, for example, Borraz and John 2004; Elcock 
2008), leadership arrangements have commanded increasing recent interest in 
Australian local government. In particular, the option of directly electing mayors, as 
opposed to their selection through a ‘cabinet-style’ councillor process, has been the 
focus of reforms in several jurisdictions. For example, NSW introduced the option for 
electing mayors at large in the Local Government Act 1993, with 32 of the 152 councils 
in that jurisdiction presently choosing to decide on their mayors by this method (NSW 
Government 1993, §227; DLG [NSW] 2012). Similarly, several  capital cities and other 
local government jurisdictions presently operate under a variety of directly elected 
mayoral systems (see, for instance, NSW Government 1988, §§23 and 23A; 
Government of South Australia 1999, §51). 
In tandem to these legislative reforms, scholarly interest in Australian local 
governmnt leadership proceeds apace. This line of inquiry has typically focussed upon 
the relationship between mayors and their appointed counterparts, together with an 
assessment of the benefits of direct mayoral election. For example, following a series of 
qualitative interviews, Martin and Aulich (2012, 16) concluded that ‘there is a body of 
opinion that a Mayor elected by a popular vote has a stronger role in relationship to the 
CEO than if elected by the council’. 
While this research has been largely descriptive in nature, a Discussion Paper by 
Sansom (2012), published under the auspices of the Australian Centre for Excellence in 
Local Government (ACELG), has drawn on selected international examples 
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(specifically New Zealand and England) and argued the case for introducing a ‘semi-
executive’ form of directly elected mayor across all Australian local government 
jurisdictions. It might be understandable that an organisation such as ACELG would 
argue for an increase in their constituents’ authority. Indeed, in the current debate it is 
frequently assumed that any move toward installing directly elected mayors is 
necessarily progressive, in a fashion which is almost historicist. However, as Svara 
(2008, 112) reminded us, the council-manager form of local government (the system 
overwhelmingly prevalent in Australia) was originally introduced in 1915 in the United 
States in response to widespread claims of corruption being endemic to the mayor-
council form – a type of local government that is endorsed in Sansom’s (2012) perferred 
‘semi-executive’ model (Sansom, 2012, 28; see also Grant, Dollery and Gow, 2011). 
Given the lack of reflection that characterises the current debate, it is possible to 
develop an alternative proposition: Can the implementation of directly elected, semi-
executive mayoral arrangements have negative outcomes? If so, what are these and – 
perhaps more practically – how are they to be assessed? One of the advantages of 
federal systems of government is that different  jurisdictions are afforded the 
opportunity of pursuing different policies. In order to explore this issue, rather than 
casting abroad to examine ‘strong mayor’ models in multivarious local government 
systems globally (see, for example, Mouritzen and Svara, 2002) this paper examines the 
results of the 2012 Queensland local government elections. Local government in 
Queensland is distinctive in Australia in that mayors have been directly elected since 
1920 (Tucker 1981, 382) with various forms of elected executive models being adopted 
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by the City of Brisbane since 1925 (Tucker, 1994). This fact affords us the unique 
opportunity of reflecting upon the consequences of directly electing mayors in the 
Australian context, in particular if direct election was an element to a ‘semi-executive’ 
form as has been advocated by Sansom (2012). 
The results of the 2012 Queensland local government elections were notable in 
this regard. First, it saw extremely high turnover rates of both mayors and councillors. 
The LGAQ (2012, 13) summarised the rammifications of these turnover rates by 
observing that: ‘[a] siginficantly higher proportion of “corporate knowledge” has been 
lost from the ranks of councillors in 2012 compared with 2008 and 2004’. Second, the 
2012 elections also witnessed a high proportion of ‘new mayors’: of the 73 local 
government bodies (LGBs) in Queensland, 44 (or 60.3 per cent) saw new mayors 
elected to office. Furthermore, these 44 new mayors were comprised of only 13 sitting 
councillors; 31 were new to elected office in local government (LGAQ, 2012, 12). This 
electoral outcome sheds an entirely different light on the question of directly elected 
mayors compared to the much rosier hue painted by ACELG, particularly if these 
mayors are expected to exercise effacious ‘semi-executive’ authority.  
In anticipation of a result along these lines, the LGAQ appointed the former 
Sunshine Coast Mayor, Bob Abbot, in December 2011 as its first ‘mayor mentor’ 
(LGAQ, 2011). It remains to be seen what the long-term consequences of such an 
election result will be. However, in the present context, the question to be examined is 
to what extent the electoral form of directly elected mayors was responsible for the loss 
in ‘institutional memory’ as noted by the LGAQ? Put differently, what other factors 
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could have led to such an extraordinary result? Moreover, what are the implications for 
the introduction of semi-executive elected mayors in other Australian jurisdictions? 
In order to explore these questions, the paper is divided into five main parts. 
Section two provides an account of Sansom’s (2012) directly elected semi-executive 
model alongside the primary justifications for recommending it to Australian local 
government writ large. Section three provides an account of Queensland local 
government and its politics more generally, arguing that the nature of local government 
in that state, alongside the forced amalgamation program of 2008 and the state election 
of 2012 must be viewed as factors contributing to the 2012 local governmet election 
outcome. Section four examines the results of both the (post-amalgamation) 2008 and 
2012 Queensland local government elections, assessing the comparative outcomes of 
the mayoral and councillor elections. The paper ends in section five by offering some 
observations on the questions we have posed, especially the implications of adopting 
directly elected mayors across other Australian local government jurisdictions. We 
argue that given the experience of Queensland, directly elected mayorsought not be 
complusorily introduced across Australian local government jurisdictions. 
 
2. THE ACELG’s (SANSOM, 2012)‘SEMI-EXECUTIVE’, DIRECTLY ELECTED 
MAYORAL MODEL 
The ACELG was formed in 2008 as a component to (then) Rudd Labor administration’s 
championing of the Australian local government sector (see, for example, Grant and 
Dollery, 2011). Operating under a multi-faceted mandate (ACELG, 2013) but with an 
7 
 
emphasis upon being ‘pratitioner driven’ (ACELG, 2009) the Centre has subsequently 
produced a quantum of research examining a range of issues pertaining to Australian 
local government, including structural reform, financial sustainability, rural-remote and 
Indigenous local government and governance and strategic leadership (ACELG 2013). 
In 2012 the Centre issued a Discussion Paper ‘Australian Mayors: What Can and 
Should They Do’, authored by its then Director, Graham Sansom. After asserting inter 
alia that ‘the question of whether a “separation of powers” between elected councillors 
and managers is meaningful and appropriate in the local government context’ (Sansom, 
2012, p, 10) and that ‘calls for more effective local leadership abound’ (Sansom, 2012, 
19) the Discussion Paper moved to posit a ‘semi-executive’model for mayors in 
Australian jurisdictions, based upon exant legislation in Australia, England and New 




Table 1: Possible Mayoral Roles and Legislation 
Function or prerogative Legislative provision (and origin) 
[1] Principal member of the 
council 
• Lead and control the business of the council (Brisbane) 
• Chair and manage meetings (All/Qld) 
• Speak on behalf of the council as the council's principal representative (NT) 
• Conduct civic and ceremonial functions (All) 
 
[2] Community leadership and 
engagement 
• Articulate and promote a vision for the area (Auckland) 
• Provide leadership and guidance to the community (Adelaide) 
• Establish processes and mechanisms to engage with the community(Auckland) 
 
[3] Selection of deputy mayor 
• Appoint the deputy mayor (Auckland) OR 
• Mayor and deputy to stand for election as a team (Melbourne) 
 
[4] Effective political 
governance 
• Establish committees of the governing body and appoint the chairperson of each 
committee (Auckland) 
• Oversee the councillors in the performance of their functions and in the exercise 
of their powers (Tas) 
• Represent accurately the policies and decisions of the council (Tas) 
 
[5] Strategic and corporate 
planning 
• Lead the development and implementation of council plans, policies, and 
budgets (Auckland/Qld) 
• Propose the adoption of the budget (Qld) 
 
[6] Guiding the chief executive 
• Lead, manage, and provide advice and strategic direction to the chief 
• Executive officer on the implementation of council policies (Qld/SA) 
• Exercise, in cases of necessity, the policy‐making functions of the governing 
body of the council between meetings (NSW) 
• Liaise with the chief executive officer on behalf of the other councillors 
(Qld/Tas) 
• Direct the chief executive officer in accordance with the council’s policies (Qld) 
• Conduct performance appraisals of the chief executive officer (Qld) 
 
[7] Inter‐government relations • Participate in inter‐governmental relationships at regional, State and national levels (Adelaide) 
 
[8] Exercise delegated authority • Exercise such other functions as the council determines (NSW/SA).  
 
Source: Sansom (2012, 30). 
 
Examining the categories down the left-hand column of Table 1 (i.e., [1] through to [8]) 
we can note that some elements of the model are uncontroversial in the Australian 
context. For example, for mayors to ‘Speak on behalf of the council as the council's 
principal representative’ [1] and for them to ‘Articulate and promote a vision for the 
area’ [2] are familiar in a context where by far the dominant model of council authority 
is the (unitary) council-manager form, which nevertheless entails a ‘separation of 
powers’ between the mayor (elected from the body of councillors) and an appointed 
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executive (General Manager/CEO) – albiet a separation of powers based upon 
convention. 
However, moving down the categories in Table 1, also discernible are roles 
that step over what Sansom (2012, 10) himself referred to as the ‘separation of powers’ 
divide. These functions include inter alia the appointment of deputy mayors by mayors 
themselves [3]; the authority to rearrange the internal structure of a council post-election 
[4]; the mayor having a guiding hand on ‘plans, policies and budgets’ (emphasis added) 
[5] and for mayors to fulfil an individual supervisory role over the appointed executive, 
inclusive of performance appraisals [6]. In short, while not recommending the 
replacement of the council-manager form with the mayor-council or ‘elected executive’ 
form of local government  (see, for example, Grant, Dollery and Gow, 2011) the 
prescribed roles for mayors comprise a ‘semi-executive’ type. 
Further, while the fine detail of these mooted reforms are critically evaluated 
elsewhere (Grant, Dollery and Kortt, 2012), in the present context it is possible to distill 
Sansom’s (2012) broad arguments for the implementation of such a model in the 
Australian context into three central claims. First, that directly elected mayors will 
increase the democratic legitimacy of local governments. Sansom (2012, 14) argued that 
the direct election of mayors results in the incubents obtaining a ‘personal mandate’, 
which enables them to ‘appeal directly to constituents.’ Second, that directly elected 
mayors are more effective operationally. For example, Sansom (2012, 24) stated: ‘Even 
though mayors may not enjoy specific additional powers ... a personal mandate... 
[allows them] ... to work more effectively with central governments ... and to exercise 
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more influence within the council organisation’. Third, that directly elected mayors 
increase accountability, in the sense that ‘[w]here people know who is in charge, they 
know whom to call to account’ (Lyons Inquiry; 2007, 17; for a detailed discussion on 
this point, see Svara 2008). 
Changes of this type to the Westminster distinction between politics and 
administration are by no means uncontroversial in the Australian context. For example, 
Rhodes and Wanna (2007) advanced strong theoretical reasons against administrators 
encroaching upon decision-making in public policy in the name of so-called ‘public 
value creation’ (see, for example, Grant and Fisher, 2011). In what follows we argue 
that there are more prosaic reasons for exercising caution in blurring the politics-
administration divide from the ‘other direction’, namely when local politicians are 
granted authority over those activities which, have been the legislated perview of 
administrators since the modernisation of all local government acts from 1989. 
Further, seen in this light, the assertion of the LGAQ (2012) concerning the 
‘significantly high’ loss of ‘corporate knowledge’ following the 2012 Queensand local 
government elections due to high turnover rates can be assessed as precisely that. What 
the LGAQ means by ‘corporate knowledge’2, and whether or not the length of 
incumbency is positively associated with it are empirical questions that lie beyond the 
scope of this paper. Rather, in what follows we argue that while other factors can be 
identified as contributing to high turnover rates of both mayors and councillors in the 
2012 Queensland local government elections, the institutional form of direct election 
                                                          
2 The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to the contestability of the claim 
by the LGAQ (2012). 
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itself has the capacity to emperil the stability of local government , particularly when 
wedded to a ‘semi-executive’ model. It is to the experience of Queensland that we now 
turn. 
 
3. SETTING THE SCENE 
3.1. Nature of Queensland Local Government 
As we have seen, Queensland is the only state where mayors are directly elected for all 
local government areas. Additionally, the direct election of mayors in Queensland has a 
long and interesting lineage. J. D. Tucker (1981, 382) noted that the introduction of 
directly elected mayors was first mooted in Queensland in 1915 as an element to the 
Labor Party’s overall plan ‘to make local government more responsive to the 
community as a whole’, coinciding with the shift from ratepayer franchise to single-vote 
adult franchise and the introduction of triennial elections. Introduced to the Queensland 
lower house by the Ryan Government in 1915, this tranche of reforms was initially 
rejected by the Legislative Council, but was eventually enacted into law in 1920. 
According to Tucker (1981, 382), the effect was to ‘place Queensland’s local 
government system decades ahead of that of most other states’. In particular, ‘[t]he 
reforms also created the conditions necessary for Queensland’s long-standing high-
profile mayor [or ‘chairman’ in shires] tradition, mayors having developed an executive 
role during the [previous] voluntarist period’. 
Three other reforms of this period are of note. First, the consolidation of local 
government areas to the status of cities - as opposed to towns or shires - in 
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Queensland’s regions, so that ‘by 1919 the total number of local authorities was reduced 
from 186 to 171’ (Tucker, 1981, 382). Second, the introduction of the Greater Brisbane 
Scheme in 1925, which saw the number of councils in Queensland reduce by 17 and 
authority for multiple functions being turned over to the Greater Brisbane Council 
(Tucker, 1981, 383). Third was the introduction, initially to Greater Brisbane Council 
and subsequently in 1936 to all Queensland local governments, of general competence 
powers, beyond ultra vires (Tucker, 1981, 384) – a status that was achieved several 
decades earlier than in other state jurisdictions (Wensing, 1997). As such, Queensland 
local government has historically been characterised by popularly elected municipal 
leadership exercising a broader range of powers than in other Australian jurisdictions. 
 
3.2. 2008 Queensland Local Government Amalgamations 
The second major influence upon 2012 Queensland local government elections was the 
amalgamation process commencing from 2004 and culminating, on 26 July 2008, with 
the forced consolidation of local authorities, reducing their number from 157 to just 73. 
While compulsory consolidation is typical of structural reforms to Australian local 
government, it was the nature of the reforms in Queensland that was to have a 
resounding effect. 
Fearing that councils were to be subject to a program of compulsory 
amalgamation, from 2005 the LGAQ undertook several steps, including the release of 
the Discussion Paper entitled Size, Shape and Sustainability (SSS) of Queensland Local 
Government to manage reform of the sector. Dollery, Chong Mun Ho and Alin (2007, 
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2) have argued that ‘in essence, the SSS process involved cooperation and collaboration 
between state government agencies and local councils on a scale unrivalled in the 
history of Australian local government reform’. 
Yet in a volte face on 7 April 2007 the Queensland government announced that it 
had renounced the SSS framework and instead appointed a Local Government Reform 
Commission ‘to make recommendations on compulsory council mergers by August 
2007 to enable the election of new councils on 15 March 2008’ (Dollery, Chong Mun 
Ho and Alin, 2007, 3). After only two months, on 27 July 2007 the Reform Commission 
released its two-volume Final Report entitled Report of the Local Government Reform 
Commission (Queensland Government [Local Government Reform Commission], 
2007), which recommended that the number of local councils be reduced from 157 to 
just 73. 
In this particular episode of forced amalgamation in Australian local government, 
not only did the Queensland Government proceed arbitrarily, but the extraordinary 
threat of criminal action against individual local councillors who sought to hold local 
plebiscites on amalgamation led to a dispute between the (then) Beattie Government and 
the (then) Howard Government (see, for example, Spooner and Magarey, 2007). It also 
rendered the issue of amalgamation a party-political one, with the (then) State 
opposition subsequently promising to ‘giving local people a choice about de-
amalgamation if elected’ (LNP, 2012).  
Following the election of the LNP at the Queensland election 24 March 2012, 
compulsory polls were held in the former shires of Mareeba, Livingstone, Douglas and 
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Noosa on 9 March 2013 (DLGCR&R, 2013a). All four voted in favour of de-
amalgamation, with the new councils (the boundaries of which were required to be the 
same as those prior to amalgamation) to ‘commence operations’ 1 January 2014 
(DLGCR&R, 2013b)3. 
 
3.3. 2012 Queensland State Election 
The outcome of the Queensland election held 24 March 2012 was extraordinary. Of the 
89 seats, a mere seven were won by the ALP, 78 by the LNP, with Bob Katter’s new 
Australia Party winning two seats alongside two independents. This represented a swing 
of 15.2 per cent to the LNP, or 13.7 per cent on a two party preferred (2PP) basis (that 
is, in seats where LNP and Labor candidates achieved first and second place under the 
preferential voting system employed in Queensland (see, for example, Green, 2012). In 
moving from 34 to 78 seats, the LNP had won the largest majority in Queensland 
political history. Conversely the ALP, in moving from 51 to just 7 seats, had suffered a 
15.7 per cent swing against it, ‘the largest recorded swing in Australian political history’ 
(Holmes, 2012, 37; see also ECQ, 2012a). 
Scott Prasser (2012) offered four ‘key reasons’ for Labor’s decline. First, the loss 
of Queensland’s AAA credit rating, followed by the sudden privatisation of several key 
utilities (rail, road, posts and forestry) had a detrimental effect upon trade union support 
for the ALP. Second, questions of integrity arose surrounding the Parliamentary ALP 
following scandals involving (former) Minister Gordon Nuttall and the controversial 
                                                          
3 The results of these compulsory polls were by no means resounding. Only Noosa registered a clear 
majority in favour (81.62 per cent) with Mareeba, Livingstone and Douglas recording majorities of 57.9, 
56.59 and 57.64 respectively (ECQ, 2013). 
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resolution of the ‘death-in-custody’ of Cameron Doomadgee on Palm Island. Third, 
delays in infrastructure development perceived as vital to the burgeoning of the South 
East Queensland growth corridor depressed support for the ALP. Finally, following a 
rancorous history (see, for example, ABC, 2012, 2-4), the formation of a united single 
conservative party in Queensland politics – in the form of the Liberal National Party 
(LNP) – in July 2008 galvanised opposition support (Holmes 2012, 3). 
While an extraordinary political event in its own right, we contend that two 
components of the state poll held 24 March significantly affected the local government 
polls held 28 April 2012. The first can be described as ‘election fatigue’ due to the two 
elections being so close together. Second, the installation of the Mayor of Brisbane, 
Campbell Newman, as leader of the newly formed LNP from outside the ranks of the 
parliamentary party reinforced the strong leadership model historically prevalent in 
Queensland and the appeal of ‘outsider’ candidates (see, for example, Ward, in Holmes, 
2012, 43). 
In sum, 2012 was a tumultuous year in Queensland state politics, witnessing the 
culmination of several forces of change that had been present for some time. The 
historical constitution of Queensland local government, the acrimonious program of 
forced amalgamation and the 2012 Queensland State election all must be assessed as 
significant factors affecting the results of the 2012 local government elections. It is to a 




4. QUEENSLAND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS 2012: RESULTS 
 
The LGAQ (2012) summarised the election results (ECQ, 2012b) which we consider 
and critically reflect upon. In terms of the nominations for both mayoral and councillor 
positions, several points are salient. First, seventeen mayors, or 23%, chose not to 
recontest the 2012 election. The LGAQ (2012, 3-4) noted that this was fewer than the 
51 mayors (or 32%) who chose not to recontest in 2008. However, the number of local 
councils had been reduced prior to the 2008 elections, from 157 to 73. Accordingly, the 
percentages for the two elections are not directly comparable since 84 local government 
areas ceased to exist. More revealing is the fact that only 20 mayors had chosen not to 
recontest in the elections both of 2004 and 2000 (LGAQ, 2012, 3). This represented a 
mere 13% for the 157 positions that then existed. Thus, whereas almost one quarter of 
directly elected mayors ‘threw in the towel’ prior to the 2012 election, only 13% chose 
to do so for the two elections immediately prior to amalgamation. This is despite the 
fact that turnover rates for mayors and councillors combined had historically been high 
– 39% in 2004 and 36.6% in 2008. 
The LGAQ (2012, 3) listed two reasons to explain the high turnover rates in 
Queensland local government. First, it cited ‘the demanding nature of the role of 
councillor’. Second, it emphasised the ‘increasing volatility in the electorate with local 
government issues now attracting greater media and public interest’, such that ‘the 
electorate can more easily influence and bring about changes at the local government 
level’. We conjecture that this rationale would more acutely impinge on directly elected 
mayors. In fact, both reasons – the demanding nature of the role due to the ‘personal 
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mandate’ achieved, and the associated increase in direct accountability – conform to 
Sansom’s (2012) arguments for direct election in his ‘semi-executive’ model. However, 
both are ‘reciprocal’ in nature, as suggested by the LGAQ (2012). Furthermore, without 
the direct support of fellow councillors (and in some instances, straining under conflict 
with them and with appointed executives) many mayors may well have decided to not 
contest more than one election. 
Second, the LGAQ (2012, 4) noted that ‘whilst the number of nominations [for 
both mayor and councillor positions] dropped by 6.3% [from 2008] interest in standing 
for Local Government election remained at high levels’. In addition, post-
amalgamation, more candidates stood as a proportion of available positions (2.73 in 
2012 and 2.95 in 2008) compared to the elections immediately prior to amalgamation 
(2.1 in 2004 and in 2000). Furthermore, the LGAQ (2012, 4) noted that ‘nominations 
for the position of mayor remained at record levels’, with an average of 3.8 mayoral 
candidates per council, similar to the 2008 election (3.9), and representing an increase 
from the number of candidates in the two elections immediately prior to amalgamation 
(3.4 in 2004 and 3 in 2000). Moreover, the LGAQ (2012, 4) also observed that ‘in 54 
councils (74%) there were fields [of candidates] for mayors more than twice as large as 
the [number of] positions available’. While this was remarkably consistent with 2008 
(78%), the number of ‘crowded’ mayoral contests increased significantly post-
amalgamation, with the comparable figures in 2004 and 2000 being 46% and 40% 
respectively. In addition, several large electorates had ‘very large numbers’ of 
candidates, with this figure increasing for the post-amalgamation elections (42% and 
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40% respectively for the 2012 and 2008 elections) from the pre-amalgamation elections 
(33% in 2004 and 30% in 2000). 
The increasingly crowded nature of mayoral elections may simply have been a 
result of council amalgamations. There were far fewer positions available while a 
roughly proportionate number of people remain interested in running for office. 
Moreover, local government politicians in Queensland are renumerated at considerably 
higher rates than in other jurisdictions and then they were pre-amalgamation.  
However, set against these arguments, it is also possible that the increased 
authority conferred upon directly elected mayors of considerably larger and financially 
more empowered councils may have a greater intrinsic appeal to a broader range of 
people. Similarly, it is difficult to completely dismiss, although equally difficult to 
measure4, what might be labelled the ‘Campbell Newman effect’: the idea that an 
‘outsider’ directly elected by popular vote will be in a better position to ‘fix’ the 
perceived problems of an individual local government area. 
The LGAQ (2012, 4) also observed that ‘whilst the increase in the actual number 
of female nominations experienced over the last four elections ceased, they were, as a 
percentage of total nominations, at record levels’, reaching 29.2% of all nominations in 
2012, up from 28.7% in 2008, and 27% and 26% in 2004 and 2000 respectively. 
Further, women candidates comprised 23.6% of all mayoral candidates in 2012, 
compared with only 17% in 2008. 
                                                          
4 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we introduce this caveat to this line of 
reasoning so as to not overemphasise the point. 
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The LGAQ (2012) also made several observations with respect to the results for 
the mayoral elections. Ten mayors were elected unopposed; six of these were returning 
while one of the remaining four was a sitting councillor. Further, 29 sitting mayors were 
returned (including the six unopposed) comprising 40% of all mayors (LGAQ, 2012, 7). 
Set against this ‘rusted on’ (or at least experienced) leadership – as noted in the 
introduction to our discussion – the LGAQ (2012, 12) also stressed that ‘44 new mayors 
(60.3%) made up of 13 sitting councillors (17.8%) and 31 new candidates (42.5%) were 
elected’, of whom 21 ‘have had no experience in the role of mayor or councillor’. It is 
noteworthy that these figures were not remarkably different from the 2008 election 
results, which saw 33 new mayors (45.2%) comprised of 15 sitting councillors (20.5%) 
and 18 new candidates (24.7%)’. Moreover, 46 new mayors (37%) were elected in 2004 
(LGAQ, 2012, 12). Nevertheless, the number of new mayors did increase by 33% from 
33 new mayors in 2008 to 44 new majors in 2012. 
As noted earlier, the ‘novice mayor’ phenomenon caused the LGAQ (2012) the 
greatest degree of concern, and induced it to recommend the appointment of a ‘mayor 
mentor’ in late 2011 (LGAQ, 2011). It is at this point that the model of directly elected 
mayors, and in particular the ‘semi-executive’ model proposed by Sansom (2012) is at 
its most vulnerable. While the on-going implications of the Queensland election results 
are impossible to gauge at this stage, we return to its potential affects at the conclusion 
of our discussion. 
In terms of elected councillors, the LGAQ (2012, 12) noted that ‘a much higher 
percentage of sitting councillors (70.83%) were successful in their bid for re-election in 
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2012, up 18.33% compared with 2008’, whereas ‘a slightly higher percentage of new 
candidates (26.1%) were successful for their bid in 2012, up 3.9% compared with 2008’ 
(LGAQ, 2012, 13). It might be tempting to argue that these councillors, alongside 
appointed executives, are presently providing a relative measure of political stability in 
Queensland local government. However, this hardly fulfils the promise of directly 
elected mayors and the ‘semi-executive’ model held out by the ACELG (Sansom, 
2012). 
 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
This paper has been primarily concerned with assessing the merits of directly electing 
mayors in Australian local government, and in particular the ‘semi-executive’ model 
proposed by Sansom (2012), in the light of recent experience in Queensland local 
government. We raised various questions. In addressing our first specific question – the 
extent to which directly elected mayors were responsible for the ‘significant loss of 
institutional memory’ in Queensland local government – we have argued that this 
assertion by the LGAQ (2012) while understandable, is an empirical question that lies 
beyond the scope of this paper. Further, we have described in some detail other factors 
that influenced the astonishing result of the 2012 local government elections. These 
factors can be listed as (a) the nature of Queensland local government; (b) the 
contextual influence of the 2008 amalgamation process; and (c) the contextual influence 
of the 2012 state election, where a ‘place-based’ leadership style was heightened, then 
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personified in Campbell Newman, to combine with a sense of electoral fatigue in 
Queensland politics. 
It is conceivable that just as big a rout of councillor positions may have taken 
place if mayors were elected by the cabinet model in Queensland. However, this does 
not mitigate against the argument that, just as directly elected mayors may increase the 
‘democracy’ (albeit of a particular type, exemplified in the idea of a ‘personal 
mandate’), the ‘operational capacity’ and the ‘accountability’ of local governments (as 
Sanson (2012) argued) so too these traits can be radically eroded through the 
mechanism of the ballot box due to the legislative requirement for direct election. This 
is principally the case with respect to operational capacity, which is a primary 
responsibility of local government. If a directly elected, ‘semi-executive’ mayor is 
charged with responsibility for (amongst other functions) providing a ‘vision’ for a local 
area, overseeing councillor roles, supervising the appointed executive, and liaising with 
other types of governance, it is difficult to envisage a novice mayor undertaking these 
roles with any degree of competence. It needs hardly be stressed that this would 
disappoint their constituents and, possibly, undermine the legitimacy of local 
government more generally. 
The alternative scenario, where a mayor is selected by all councillors – thereby 
achieving an executive, as well as a popular legitimacy – and where councillors can 
move collectively to both govern and administer, is far more reassuring. In examining 
the relationship between state and local politics, as we have sought to do in the account 
of Queensland presented here, it is possible to speculate that a requirement for overall 
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political stability in the face of radical change in state politics may well override the 
agendas of reform-driven mayors. This requirement is far more likely to be achieved by 
mayors elected through the ‘cabinet mode’. It may well be the case that in a situation of 
rapid councillor turnover, the mayor is selected by default (i.e. the last person left from 
the previous council becomes the mayor for the new term). At least this option is 
available under the cabinet model, whereas under direct mayoral election it is not. In 
this sense, the layers of Australia’s federal system balance each other; in this sense also 
the centrality of the cabinet model to that system is emphasised. 
This leads to the final consideration of the paper. In light of the study of 
Queensland presented here, the idea that directly elected mayors be compulsorily 
legislated for across Australian local government jurisdictions ought to be rejected. If 
there is a perceived requirement for stronger, more popular leadership in Australian 
local government, it can be accommodated adequately – and democratically – with the 
implementation of the method in NSW whereby a referendum to move to popular 
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